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There is a condition of epidemic proportion afflicting the budgets and operations 
of law enforcement agencies across the nation. The condition is the persistently high 
incident rates of false burglar alarms, whereby alarms activate and summon the police 
to locations for absolutely no legitimate law enforcement purpose. Statistics have 
consistently indicated that these false alarms regularly account for between 94% and 
99% of all alarm calls-for-service in most U.S. jurisdictions (Blackstone, Hakim, & 
Spiegel, 2002; Blackstone, Buck & Hakim, 2005; Cunningham, Strauchs, & Van Meter, 
1990).  Nonetheless, most police agencies continue to respond in good faith to every 
alarm call, nationally wasting countless taxpayer dollars each year and delaying police 
responses to true calls for law enforcement services as a result. In a time when many 
police agencies report rising call-volumes and higher response times due to staffing 
constraints, most law enforcement officials and other stakeholders agree something 
must be done about the false alarm dilemma—and a relatively new protocol known as 
verified response is attracting considerable attention as a viable solution. 
Today, studies on numerous jurisdictions across the U.S. that utilize verified 
response indicate unanimous reported outcomes of dramatically lower false alarm 
dispatches. As such, verified response certainly warrants closer examination and 
serious consideration for all police agencies experiencing persistent false alarms 
interfering with their ability to respond to legitimate calls-for-service. In this paper, 
research about the benefits and concerns relative to verified response are reviewed. 
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False alarms, also commonly and appropriately called nuisance alarms, have 
been occurring for ages. However, relative to the ever-increasing wide-spread usage of 
alarm systems in recent years, the problem is generally getting worse. The current high 
rate of false alarms emerged out of the rapid growth within the alarm industry between 
the 1970s and 1990s, resulting in the affordability, immediate availability, and increase 
in installation of alarm systems in both businesses and residences throughout society. 
The National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association estimated that some 32 million security 
alarm systems had been installed in the United States, with an estimated 3 million new 
systems anticipated to be installed each year going forward (Sampson, 2007).  Light 
(2001) estimated that at least one in seven U.S. businesses and one in five U.S. 
residences was equipped with an alarm system. As such, stakeholders, including law 
enforcement agencies, alarm companies, alarm users, and local governments, are 
increasingly aware of and concerned with the waste of public resources associated with 
false alarms and are all involved to varying degrees in trying to stop or minimize their 
occurrence. 
To give some perspective, research conducted by Blackstone, Buck, & Hakim 
(2005) found that police in the U.S. respond to approximately 36 million alarm 
activations per year, at an estimated cumulative cost of $1.8 billion annually. Given it is 
projected that false alarms make up some 94% to 98% of all alarm calls for service 
(Blackstone, Hakim, & Spiegel, 2002; Blackstone et al. 2005; Cunningham, Strauchs, & 
Van Meter, 1990), and these alarms constitute approximately 10% to 25% of all calls- 





operational waste occurring.  Theoretically, it is projected that if the false alarm problem 
could be solved, some 35,000 officers across the nation could be regularly freed-up to 
respond to legitimate police calls (Blackstone, Hakim, & Spiegel, 2000; Blackstone, 
Buck, and Hakim, 2005).  Even so, as evidenced by the continued persistence of high 
false alarm rates and police responses to them in the United States, reducing false 
alarms is a complex issue. 
In practice, there are many combinations of false alarm solutions being tried with 
varying reported results.  Perhaps it comes as no surprise, but outcomes of 
examinations seem to be curiously skewed dependent upon the vested interest of the 
stakeholders. For example, Lee (2006) reported in his study that the private security 
industry, which is almost entirely responsible for alarm system sales, installations, and 
monitoring, was estimated to accrue revenues of over $100 billion annually.  As one can 
imagine, the alarm industry has a significant interest in characterizing alarm systems as 
ideal technology, and the industry wields its considerable influence to support that 
assertion in alarm system reliability and effectiveness arguments. This being the case, 
it would be an extensive undertaking to review and describe all the research validating 
and refuting the different perspectives concerning false alarms in one paper. Therefore, 
only the perspective of law enforcement and the viability of the relatively new solution 
called verified response for addressing high false alarm rates will be the focused on 
here. 
To simplify understanding of the two primary variables examined in this paper, 
false alarms are those specific types that cause law enforcement services to be 





the other hand, is the law enforcement protocol, irrespective of minor variations, 
whereby law enforcement agencies set policy consisting of the central prerequisite that 
no officers will be dispatched to an alarm call until the cause of the alarm activation can 




When looking at the false alarm problem from a law enforcement perspective, 
and why verified response simply makes sense, one can view the advantages from two 
general directions: fiscal policy and customer service or operational effectiveness. 
Generally speaking, both can be fundamentally addressed concurrently by saying that 
public law enforcement is like any other private service industry in that success is 
directly related to efficiency and effectiveness.  Regardless of police agencies being 
non-profit public organizations, they operate on many of the same business principles 
as the private sector. Therefore, by either standard it is clearly an example of poor 
management if police agencies overspend on nonessentials while leaving primary 
responsibilities unfunded, or if they deploy too many patrol officers to low crime areas 
while leaving high crime areas to suffer.  In the same way, it is as significant a remission 
of sound fiscal and operational judgment when law enforcement agencies consistently 
waste their time and effort maintaining zero-exception alarm response policies when 
research clearly shows they are almost always universally “false” (Blackstone et al., 
2005; Cunningham et al. 1990). 
It is also important to remind people of the sole purpose for which intrusion alarm 





should an environment protected by an alarm system become unlawfully breeched for 
the commission of some other type of crime. The key ingredient of legitimate alarm 
activation is that there is some actual criminal event triggering the alarm activation. 
Unfortunately, police organizations across America are, and have been for years, 
experiencing the harsh reality that burglar alarms activate indiscriminately, regardless of 
the stimuli, which rarely are ever actual burglars. There are several implications to this 
reality, not the least of which is officer-safety. Repeated high false alarms erode officer 
caution due to complacency.  If, on average, 98% of alarm calls over a long period of 
time are false, the mind-set in terms of officer preparedness is weakened when the 
officers respond to the rare 2% true incidents. Police are trained not to treat any call as 
routine, but, at some point the repetitiveness of responding to false alarms undoubtedly 
diminishes officer alertness to some extent. 
The sad truth is that false alarms are very preventable when considering that 
most occur as a result of user error, improper installation, and family pets (Sampson, 
2007).  A number of early studies determined false alarms to be attributable to user 
error some 40% to 60% of the time, and a CSAA False Alarm Study (1992) determined 
the user error rate to be 75%. Advancements in technology that make systems more 
user-friendly and reliable, as well as better information being provided to clients on how 
to use their systems, have improved some user error rates today; however, overall false 
alarm rates continue to flourish. 
To further put the problem into perspective, Sampson (2007) provided an 
overview of research relative to the false alarm dilemma affecting law enforcement 





alarms making up 94% to 99% of all alarm calls as indicated by Blackstone et al.  
(2005); however, it also reviewed earlier research indicating that similar false alarm 
rates had been occurring in the previous two decades as well (Cunningham & Taylor, 
1985).  Making matters worse, studies showed that when the police respond to the rare 
“true” alarms, the criminals are almost always long gone when they arrive (Blackstone  
et al., 2005). Supporting even further the position that indiscriminately responding to 
alarm calls significantly impacts police agencies, are findings by Blackstone et al. (2005) 
pointing out that the dollar amounts of federal funds traditionally allocated to supplement 
inadequate state and local law enforcement budgets are clearly on a progressive 
downward trend, compelling the police to increase efficiency and effectiveness like 
never before in order to continue providing their most important services.  For the Harris 
County Sheriff’s Office in Houston, Texas—the largest county law enforcement agency 
in the state, the total alarm calls-for-service dispatched each year since 2010 has 
exceeded 100,000, with over 95% of them being “false” (Harris County Sheriff’s Office 
2010; Harris County Sheriff’s Office 2011; Harris County Sheriff’s Office 2012; Harris 
County Sheriff’s Office 2013). 
There are many contributing factors to why false alarms so frequently occur and 
a variety of proactive efforts other than verified response being tried to control them. For 
instance, many jurisdictions have implemented graduating false alarm fines, increased 
alarm permit fees to off-set costs, and false alarm education and training classes. 
Unfortunately, as the continuing high false alarm rates indicate, the benefits of these 
other initiatives are modest at best in lowering the occurrence of false alarm calls. On 





responses by the police, which from a law enforcement perspective is the ultimate 
objective.  A review of literature indicated that since Nichols (2006) identified 30 U.S. 
and Canadian counties and cities that had officially adopted verified response with 
measurable success; there have since been a rapidly growing number of additional 
agencies to do so, or work toward doing so, throughout the nation. 
It should be noted here before examining specific research supporting verified 
response, that while it involves the enactment of an official policy whereby alarm calls- 
for-service are met with the requirement that either alarm monitoring companies or their 
designees first verify alarm activations as “true” prior summoning law enforcement, 
exempted from all verified response policies are those calls manually activated by the 
user, such as panic, duress, or hold-up alarms. The reason for this is that alarms 
requiring manual, human initiated activation are far more likely to be deliberately 
triggered and true, which should therefore always be responded to accordingly by the 
police. 
When police agencies adopt verified response, necessitating an alarm  
company’s call center (i.e. alarm monitoring center) to first take steps to verify law 
enforcement is needed; alarm calls-for-service inevitably go down significantly.  For 
example, an extensive independent study commissioned by the Sonitrol Corporation, a 
verified electronic security solutions provider, surveyed 20 police departments across 
the United States and Canada employing verified response policies and determined that 
such policies reduced police dispatch rates an average of 72% (as cited in Nichols, 
2006).  In another study by ADT, one of the largest American security system providers, 





dispatches to businesses by 50% (“Industry leaders,” 2003). Individual reports by 
jurisdictions adopting verification requirements report similar benefits. The Salt Lake 
City Police Department, for example, reported that their verified response policy 
resulted in a police response reduction to false alarms of over 90% after one year 
following implementation (Blackstone et al. 2005); and the Dallas Police Department 
reported a 45% reduction in false dispatches one year after its implementation of a 
verified response policy in 2006 (Dallas Police Department, 2007). 
Thus far, research examining verified response practices corroborates what  
could be logically assumed, which is that by setting response prerequisites as opposed 
to simply responding every time alarms sound decreases unnecessary police responses 
and diminishes the associated waste of law enforcement resources (Eugene Police 
Department, 2004). Therefore, the tremendous monetary and operational costs of 
excessive false alarm calls plaguing law enforcement agencies across the U.S., and the 
residual effects with respect to the diversion false alarm calls cause police and support 
personnel by delaying their responses to true needs for law enforcement; can be 
remedied by implementing a verified response approach. 
COUNTER POSITION 
 
Nonetheless, there are perspectives that conflict with the aforementioned 
benefits confirmed by the data. Conceptually, alarms seem to be ideal target-hardening 
devices, and research from both the U.S. and U.K. lend some support to the assertion 
that burglar alarms are among the most effective burglary-deterrence measures 
(Palmer, Holmes, & Hollin, 2002). For this reason, the resounding chant from the 





effectiveness in terms of police responding to them to catch perpetrators, suggest that 
verified response is an affront on the expectation of police responsibility.  However, it is 
important to note that insofar as people believing that alarms help police catch burglars, 
not only does burglary remain one of the most commonly reported crimes, but the 
clearance rate for burglaries in the U.S. has remained under 15% for many years 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004). This would suggest that whatever contribution 
burglar alarms make, it is virtually indiscernible when measured against both burglar 
alarm rates and burglar apprehension rates. 
Another counter position is that “true” burglar alarms that would have received a 
certain and timely law enforcement response if verified response policies were not in 
place, will end up being neglected. Following this logic, verified response policies “may 
ultimately result in a higher rate of intrusion-related crimes due to undermining the 
deterrent effect of certain and timely detection and response” (Buck, 2004, p. 2).  In 
essence, two concerns commonly stressed by opponents of verified response focuses 
on the small percentage of true alarms for which no burglar is apprehended in the 
commission of his or her crime due to the delayed response and the potential effect of 
higher rates of burglary due to more burglars committing the crime because of an 
instituted verified response in their area of operation. On its surface, it is reasonable to 
put forth such arguments; however, in the jurisdictions studied by Nichols (2006), 69% 
reported lower rates of burglary after implementation of verified response. With regard 
to apprehensions resulting from delayed responses, as already stated, the arrest of 
burglars in the commission of their crimes at sites with and without alarm activations 





Additionally, in one study reviewed, LeBeau and Vincent (1998) found that 
burglars were more likely to be caught by the police on premises without alarm systems 
than on those equipped with them. Similarly, in his survey of 20 police departments 
across North America employing verified response, Nichols (2006) indicated there were 
no reported side-affects relative to the rate of burglar apprehensions, and the 
respondents reported that verified response was actually meeting or surpassing their 
overall expectations. 
For the most part, as confirmed by Nichol’s survey (2006) and most editorials, 
when verified response is introduced for the first time in jurisdictions, there is usually 
what can be described as an initial “knee jerk” opposition due to a misperceived 
reduction of police services. However, in almost every case examined over time, 
communities are relatively quick to accept, and even become advocates for the verified 
response methodology once they are educated on the pros and cons of verified 
response’s purpose and effectiveness. 
It would be remiss not to place special emphasis on what is logically the source 
of most aggressive counter positions to verified response: the alarm system industry. 
Much of the literature critical of verified response is developed and disseminated by the 
alarm industry.  If alarm calls must be verified by them or their designee before calling 
the police, it is the alarm companies that will have to shoulder the associated costs.  In 
1990, there were an estimated 13,000 alarm companies operating in the United States, 
with a projected doubling of that number by the turn of the new millennium 
(Cunningham et al. 1990). Today, that projection has been well exceeded. 





systems impose and champion the benefits they provide. After all, security systems 
account for about 58% of the industry’s revenue (“Industry leaders,” 2003). Therefore, 
irrespective of the problems alarm systems present for law enforcement, other 
emergency services, and third parties, the alarm industry is likely to divert concerns 
using supportive examples such as the study by Rutgers University (2009), suggesting 
alarm systems reduce burglary incident rates. 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
Law enforcement agencies have been experimenting for years with various ways 
to address the excessive and widespread false alarm rates without inconveniencing 
others. They have made appeals to alarm companies and to the public to assist in 
addressing the problems, and they have tested an array of relatively non-invasive 
approaches aimed at off-setting or recovering, at least to some extent, the considerable 
monetary and other associated costs imposed by false alarms. Unfortunately, none of 
these efforts have proven to be sufficient solutions for most jurisdictions, as false alarm 
occurrences still run rampant. Ideally, the alarm companies and alarm users would 
have long since self-corrected the problems so police could concentrate their efforts 
only on legitimate law enforcement functions; however, the police continue responding 
to false alarms nearly a hundred times more frequently than to those that are true. It 
really does come down to one simple premise: if false alarm rates cannot be 
significantly reduced by those who install and use alarm systems, then the police must 
take it upon themselves to reduce their responses to them. 
Research showed that verified response is an effective remedy for the high 





Sonitrol Corporation, which objectively examined verified response in use throughout 
North America, confirmed its effectiveness without exception (as cited in Nichols, 2006). 
Verified response has been shown to relieve law enforcement of the unaffordable 
financial burden and relentless distraction false alarms impose on their ability to perform 
core police functions. Additionally, verified response also alleviates the incredulous 
burden false alarms have on police dispatchers, who, in many jurisdictions, are 
operating at less than ideal staffing levels much like the police. Adopting a verified 
response policy appears to be the most viable and effective approach law enforcement 
agencies can undertake to simply stop the hemorrhaging of wasted resources on false 
alarm calls—for which there is no redeeming value whatsoever. 
Perhaps the best way law enforcement can promote their adoption of verified 
response to the citizenry is to make it clear that the necessity of its implementation is 
only as enduring as the problem it is intended to address. In other words, adopting 
verified response may serve as the impetus to alarm companies and the public coming 
up with otherwise equally effective, yet perhaps less seemingly aggressive, solutions to 
reducing false alarms and/or police responses to them. Until then, verified response 
appears to be the only proven, substantially effective remedy employable entirely at the 
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